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"Homeownership is the American dream. It is the opportunity for
all Americans to put down roots and start creating equity for themselves
and their families."' To finance that dream, Americans turn to mortgage
brokers and lenders. Because homeownership represents the single most
complicated and expensive investment for most Americans, individuals
commonly place significant trust in their brokers and lenders to represent
their best interests. Although most individuals in the mortgage industry
work hard to obtain fair and reasonable financing for consumers, there
are a number of predatory brokers and lenders who abuse their positions
of trust and superior bargaining position by taking unfair advantage of
the financial constraints and time pressures that often face borrowers.
Unscrupulous brokers and lenders sometimes employ tactics that
deceive borrowers yet result in profitable business for the mortgage in-
dustry.2 These practices, including partial disclosure or nondisclosure of
material terms, or changing the loan type or interest rate as closing ap-
proaches, are commonly referred to as "predatory lending practices."
Many of these practices, through which certain players in the mortgage
industry take advantage of borrowers, are on the margins of legality.
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1. Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Response: Hearing Before the U.S.
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Predatory Mort-
gage Lending Hearing] (opening statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
2. See id. at 2 (opening statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
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Although federal statutes regulating the lending industry are sup-
ported by strong policy statements that appear to provide significant pro-
tection for borrowers,3 ambiguous contract terms, weak enforcement
provisions, and numerous statutory exceptions undermine the protective
purposes of such statutes. In response to these federal loopholes and the
recent increase in predatory lending practices, many states and munici-
palities have enacted more stringent regulations.4 Despite the protective
purpose of these regulations, however, many in the mortgage industry
oppose these regulations and contend that state laws complicate the
mortgage process, creating higher transaction costs and reducing access
to credit.5 Federal lawmakers have reacted to the industry's concerns by
exempting federal banks from many state statutes. However, this type of
federal preemption hinders state enforcement efforts and creates incen-
tives for businesses to seek a regulatory structure that guarantees the
6fewest consumer protections.
Consequently, federal and state regulations have consistently failed
to adequately protect borrowers from predatory lenders. Some state con-
sumer protection statutes, however, provide consumers with a private
right of action, an expanded statute of limitations, and attorney's fees.7 In
the context of predatory lending, federal courts have recognized that cer-
tain violations of federal lending statutes, namely the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act ("RESPA") and the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"), amount to unfair and deceptive practices for purposes of meet-
ing the "unfair and deceptive act or practice" element of certain state
consumer protection statutes.8 To further the purposes and policies of
RESPA and TILA, consumers should utilize state consumer protection
statutes 9 when practices in the mortgage transaction industry violate
3. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000).
4. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (1999).
5. Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation, and Litigation: Federal Regu-
lation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78, 84 (2002).
6. Predatory Lending: Are Federal Agencies Protecting Older Americans from Financial
Heartbreak?: Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 108th Cong. 60 (2004) [here-
inafter Committee on Aging Hearing] (statement of Gavin Gee, Director of Idaho Department of
Finance).
7. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B (West 2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 494.0078 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25 (West 2003); 63 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 456.503 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003);
Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1147-1148 (W.D. Wash.
2003).
9. The state consumer protection statutes discussed in this article are used interchangeably with
unfair and deceptive acts or practices ("UDAP") statutes.
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these federal lending statutes, thereby constituting unfair and deceptive
conduct.
This article continues in Part II by defining predatory lending prac-
tices, identifying borrowers who are likely to face predatory lenders, and
discussing the consequences of predatory lending. Next, Part III provides
a background for existing federal regulation, again in reference to
RESPA and TILA. Part IV discusses state legislative efforts to curb
predatory lending and identifies the problems of inconsistency and fed-
eral exemptions that undermine these state statutes. Part V examines the
elements of state consumer protection acts and unfair and deceptive acts
or practices ("UDAP") statutes and their application to predatory prac-
tices. Part VI argues that, because consumer protection statutes have
nearly uniform elements in all states, such statutes provide significant
protection for borrowers and have a considerable effect on curbing
abuses in the mortgage industry. Thus, consumer protection statutes rep-
resent an effective alternative to weakened federal and state predatory
lending statutes. Part VII concludes this article with the recommendation
that predatory lending victims utilize the protection afforded by state
consumer protection and UDAP statutes to hold predatory brokers and
lenders responsible for engaging in predatory practices.
II. PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
A. Predatory Lending in the Prime and Subprime Markets
A mortgage represents a transfer of a property interest by a bor-
rower to a lender as security for payment of a debt.10 Because a lender
wants to guarantee repayment of the debt, it will usually perceive a bor-
rower with a high credit rating to be a low risk investment; consequently,
the lender will usually approve mortgages for such borrowers and pro-
vide them with favorable interest rates. 1 This market is primarily re-
ferred to as the prime market.' 2 Although predatory lending does occur in
the prime market, 13 such practices are often deterred by competition
10. MARGARET C. JASPER, HOME MORTGAGE LAW PRIMER 5 (2nd ed. Oceana Publications
2000) (1995).
1I. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 1, at 56 (prepared statement of the
Honorable Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of the State of Iowa).
12. The prime market primarily serves borrowers who have higher credit ratings, borrow
greater loan amounts, select longer repayment periods, and accordingly, represent lower risks to the
lender. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDA-
TORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 27 (2000) [hereinafter Treasury/HUD Report].
13. Id. at 2.
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among lenders, greater homogeneity in loan terms, and prime borrowers'
greater familiarity with complex financial transactions.'
4
Borrowers with lower credit ratings, however, purportedly repre-
sent higher risk investments. 5 Because many prime lenders are unwilling
to take such investment risks, borrowers with low credit ratings tend to
borrow from subprime lenders. 16 A subprime lender denotes a lender
who provides loans to high risk consumers.17 Although subprime lenders
play an important role in financing home loans for those who likely
would not qualify for prime rates, some lenders take advantage of sub-
prime borrowers by charging higher rates than the increased risk justi-
fies.
18
In recent years, the subprime lending market has witnessed dra-
matic growth. In 2003, more than $332 billion in mortgage loans origi-
nated from subprime lenders, compared to $125 billion in 1997.19 Com-
pared with prime lending, subprime lending generally has the character-
istics of higher risk, lower loan amounts, higher origination costs, and
faster repayments. 20 Subprime lending is not, in itself, predatory lend-
ing.2' The subprime market often provides an important source of credit
for many borrowers who struggle to obtain economic opportunities.
2
However, subprime lending becomes predatory when material
terms are not timely and accurately disclosed, excessive fees are packed
into the loan, large prepayment penalties lock the borrower into high
rates, or monthly payments are much higher than the borrower can af-
ford.23 Predatory lending commonly occurs in markets where unscrupu-
lous lenders prey on certain identifiable groups, such as the elderly, eth-
nic minorities, and individuals with lower incomes and less education.
24
These individuals may not be sufficiently experienced or knowledgeable
about complex financial transactions to understand the potentially devas-
tating implications of such transactions, or may not be offered the range
14. Id.
15. See id. at27.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 72.
19. Committee on Aging Hearing, supra note 6, at 37 (statement of Howard Beales, Director of
the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission).
20. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12, at 27-28.
21. Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (Sen. Johnson, Member, Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 1-2 (opening statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
24. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12, at 22.
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of financial products available to other borrowers.2 5 Even educated and
financially savvy individuals facing financial pressures have become vic-
tims of predatory loan practices.
B. What Constitutes a Predatory Lending Practice
Although the term "predatory lending" does not have a precise
definition, the most significant indicators of predatory practices are inac-
curate disclosures, changes in loan types and interest rates, and dispro-
portionately high fees 26 and points27 financed by the borrower.28 Most
predatory practices are essentially a means by which to increase the fees
and points for a loan. 29 As the fees and points increase, the likelihood
that a borrower will not be able to afford the loan increases.30 Brokers
and lenders often have an incentive to lend without regard to the bor-
rower's ability to repay because such nonperforming loans3' usually re-
sult in refinancing, which increases the profit for the lender.32
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, Iowa's Attorney General characterized predatory
lending as a mindset with the following operative principle: "Take as
much as you think you can get away with, however you can, from who-
ever you think is a likely mark., 33 Although the prime market remains
highly competitive, the subprime market has little competition, virtually
no advertisements or other publicity about the price of loans, and limited
access to information about the loans.
34
25. Id.
26. See JASPER, supra note 10, at 89-90. Fees represent the closing costs associated with mort-
gage loans. Id. Such fees typically include the following: an application fee, an appraisal fee, a credit
report fee, escrow fees (insurance and taxes), a flood certification fee, flood insurance, a funding fee,
a home inspection, homeowner's insurance, legal fees, mortgage taxes, prepaid interest, private
mortgage insurance recording fees, a survey fee, title insurance, and a title search. Id.
27. See JASPER, supra note 10, at 26. Points are charges for making the loan and are payable at
the time of closing; each point equals one percent of the loan. Id.
28. Margot Sanders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6
N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 121 (2002).
29. Id.
30. Id.
3 1. A nonperforming loan is a loan financed at a rate that the borrower cannot afford. Because
the borrower cannot afford the loan, he or she is forced to refinance. By compelling the borrower to
refinance, the lender makes a higher profit from the fees required to refinance and the borrower loses
the equity he or she has earned in the home. See id.
32. Id.
33. Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of Hon. Thomas J.
Miller, Attorney General of the State of Iowa).
34. Id.
2005] 439
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Broad language and illustrative acts or practices are more effective
in defining predatory practices than is a bright line definition "because
the human imagination is a wondrous thing, and its capacity to invent
new scams, new permutations on old scams, and new ways to sell those
scams is infinite. 35 Similarly, the Washington State Department of Fi-
nancial Institutions broadly defines predatory lending as "the use of de-
ceptive or fraudulent sales practices in the origination of a loan secured
by real estate.' 36 Additionally, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") stated that predatory lending-whether under-
taken by creditors, brokers, or even home improvement contractors-
involves engaging in deception or fraud,37 manipulating the borrower
through aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage of a bor-
rower's lack of understanding about loan terms.38 These practices are
often combined with loan terms that, alone or in combination, are abu-
sive or make the borrower more vulnerable to abusive practices. 39 The
results are loans, loaded with onerous terms and conditions, that the bor-
rower often cannot repay, leading to refinancing, foreclosure, or bank-
ruptcy.40
Predatory lending practices can be divided into two broad catego-
ries: predatory terms and predatory procedures. Where the terms of a
mortgage are excessive, unfair, or unreasonable based on the credit risk
of the borrower, they are considered predatory.41 Common examples of
predatory terms include the following: unreasonably high interest rates,
excessive fees, and prepayment penalties.42 Unreasonably high interest
rates are problematic because borrowers often do not realize that they
qualify for rates lower than those secured by their brokers.43 Excessive
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id. (citing comments from John Bley, Director of Financial Institutions, State of Washing-
ton, on responsible alternative mortgage lending to Office of Thrift Supervision (July 3, 2000)).
37. Although in some cases, predatory practices are sufficient to meet the elements of fraud,
this article refers to fraudulent practices as defined by state consumer protection statutes. See e.g.,
Dwyer v. J.1. Kislak Mortgage Corp., 103 Wash. App. 542, 546, 13 P.3d 240 (Wash. App. 2000).
38. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12 at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 17. Borrowers may attempt to refinance a predatory loan; however, the fees required
to refinance are often prohibitive, and consequently, lead some borrowers into bankruptcy.
41. Id. at 17-24.
42. Id. at 18-22.
43. Id. at 2. This is especially prevalent in subprime lending markets because brokers may
assure unwary borrowers that this is the best rate they can secure and that they must quickly agree in
order to lock in the rate. 1d. at 1. The complicated and time-consuming process to obtain a quote for
an interest rate also contributes to unreasonably high rates because borrowers often do not have the
time or the resources to obtain several brokers and lenders, complete the necessary paperwork, com-
pare several quotes, and then make an informed decision on the best interest rate. Id. Additionally,
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fees that exceed the amount expected or justified based on the economic
position of the borrower include high origination fees (which may be in
excess of ten percent of the principal amount of the loan) and other set-
tlement costs, such as loan processing fees, credit reporting fees, and un-
derwriting fees. 4 Moreover, a broker or lender's failure to accurately or
timely disclose these fees prevents borrowers from making informed
credit decisions. Similarly, prepayment penalties, which are fees assessed
against the borrower for paying off the loan amount prior to the due date,
represent a predatory practice because they severely inhibit a borrower's
ability to refinance a predatory loan.45 Subprime loans are disproportion-
ately more likely to require penalties for prepayment, making them ex-
pensive to refinance, and sometimes trapping the borrower in an overly
expensive loan.46 In 2001, 76% of subprime loans had prepayment penal-
ties, but only 2% of prime loans included these penalties.47
In addition to predatory terms, loans can be predatory where the
procedures by which the broker originates the loan or the lender funds
the loan place the borrower in an unfair or coercive position to accept a
harmful loan.48 Examples of procedural predatory lending include the
following: loan flipping, nondisclosure of material terms, and the misuse
of yield spread premiums.49
the quoted interest rate does not always show the actual amount the borrower will be paying because
other fees, such as yield spread premiums, may cause the borrower to pay a higher amount through-
out the life of the loan. Id.
44. Id. at 39-40, 80. This represents a particularly egregious practice because borrowers often
do not realize that their settlement costs differ significantly from a non-predatory loan. Additionally,
these fees are often higher than those represented on the good faith estimates, but not to the degree
that would violate RESPA's requirement that they be made in good faith and bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the amount the borrower is required to pay. Id. at I. As a consequence, this practice of
packing excessive fees often goes unnoticed by borrowers and unregulated by federal statutes. Id.
45. Id. at 94. Prepayment penalties are not problematic for borrowers who have too much
money and want to pay off the entire loan amount; rather, it is when borrowers with high interest
loans want to refinance at a lower interest rate. Id. The fee assessed against the borrower as a pre-
payment penalty effectively prohibits the ability to refinance because the benefit of refinancing at a
lower rate will be outweighed by the high fee that must be paid for paying off the original loan. Id.
This particularly affects borrowers who are assured by their brokers not to worry about the high
interest rate because they can refinance later. Id. Although the inclusion of a prepayment penalty in
this situation renders that promise fraudulent, borrowers usually do not have sufficient evidence to
prove this promise to refinance the loan. Id.
46. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 1, at 56 (prepared statement of the
Honorable Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of the State of Iowa).
47. Id.
48. See Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12, at 79.
49. See id. at 73-80. A yield spread premium represents a fee paid by the lender to the broker
for securing a higher interest rate. See id. Although the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment has stated that yield spread premiums are not per se illegal because they can provide a mean-
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Fraudulent and deceptive practices are manifested by loan flipping,
a situation where borrowers are encouraged to refinance repeatedly over
a short period of time. 50 Loan flipping is a damaging predatory practice
because borrowers are usually refinancing to obtain needed money to pay
other debts or to attempt to secure a more favorable interest rate.5 1 How-
ever, with each successive refinancing, the originators charge high fees
and consequently strip borrowers' equity in their homes.52
In addition to loan flipping, a broker's or lender's failure to provide
timely and accurate disclosures of a loan's material terms is a harmful
predatory practice because the borrower is not able to make a reasoned,
informed decision to enter into the loan.53 Often, when material terms are
not disclosed to the potential borrower until or near closing, the borrower
is not in a position to reject the terms of the loan or to shop around for a
more favorable mortgage.54
Another common procedural predatory practice is the misuse of
yield spread premiums. The payment of yield spread premium occurs
when the lender pays the broker an indirect compensation for securing a
mortgage at an interest rate higher than that which the lender would have
been willing to agree for the particular mortgage. 55 Yield spread premi-
ums, which are paid by the lender, are considered indirect fees for bor-
rowers because the payment of premiums typically results in a higher
56interest rate to the borrower. HUD maintains that indirect fees, such as
yield spread premiums, give consumers who are unable to pay direct fees
the ability to obtain home loans. 57 Arguably, if the broker or lender prop-
erly discloses the yield spread premium to the borrower and provides the
option of paying these fees directly in lieu of increasing the interest rate,
ingful choice for borrowers who want to defer closing costs by paying a higher interest rate for the
life of the loan, they must be disclosed to the borrower. See id.
50. Id. at 73.
51. Id. at 73.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 24.
54. Id. at 65-66.
55. See id. at 85, 89. These payments usually range from one to two percent of the principal
loan amount, although they may be as high as three to five percent. The most significant problem
with yield spread premiums is that they are perceived by the borrower as a separate payment not
connected to his or her loan because the payment is not coming directly from borrower. They do not
realize that the payment of the yield spread premium will have a dramatic effect on the amount paid
throughout the life of the loan, as reflected in the higher interest rate.
56. See id. at 89.
57. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regard-
ing Lender Payments to Mortgage brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,080 (March 1, 1999) [hereinafter RESPA
Statement of Policy] (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 3500).
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the payment of the yield spread premium is not predatory.5 8 In practice,
mortgage brokers receive both direct fees from the borrower and indirect
yield spread premiums from the lender without reducing direct closing
fees paid by the borrower; meanwhile the lender increases the interest
rate for the consumer to cover the cost of the yield spread premium with-
out disclosing to the consumer that he or she is paying the extra cost.
59
Thus, yield spread premiums are problematic for two reasons. First,
the purpose of a yield spread premium and its relationship with the inter-
est rate are often not disclosed to the borrower. Second, rather than de-
fraying the closing costs, the yield spread premium often constitutes an
unearned fee, a bonus payment to the broker for which the broker has
provided no additional services to the borrower.
60
With respect to the first problem, although lender payments to
mortgage brokers must be revealed on government mandated disclosure
statements, the form of the disclosure is cryptic and does not reveal the
relationship between the interest rate charged on the borrower's mort-
gage and the magnitude of the yield spread premium. 61 For example, the
disclosure of a $4000 yield spread premium on a good faith estimate is
typically listed among numerous other charges and identified as "YSP of
$4000 POC.'62 For the typical borrower in either the prime or subprime
market, this cryptic form of disclosure is not sufficient to enable the bor-
rower to make an informed credit decision. Some brokers and lenders
actually fail to provide any disclosure of the yield spread premium until
the point at which the borrower signs the closing documents.6 3
The second problem is that yield spread premiums often constitute
an unearned fee to the broker, rather than a benefit to borrowers. Despite
the industry's assertion that the yield spread premium increases access to
loans for individuals who cannot afford the up-front costs, at least one
study examines the use of yield spread premiums and indicates that
58. See Taiesha L. Cantwell, Yield Spread Premiums: Who's Working for the Borrower?
HUD's Erroneous Regulation and its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAW & INEQ. 367, 372 (2003).
59. Id. When combined with an origination fee of two to three percent of the principal amount
of the loan, yield spread premiums of two to three percent amount to a very substantial payment to
the broker. Id.
60. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Use of Yield Spread Premiums: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Dev., 107th Cong. 2 (2002) [hereinafter
Yield Spread Premiums Hearing] (opening statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Dev.).
61. Id. at 160 (citing Howell E. Jackson & Jerome Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The
Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 95 (January 8, 2002)).
62. "Yield spread premium of $4,000 paid outside of closing."
63. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1143
(W.D. Wash. 2003).
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mortgage brokers earn substantially more on loans when yield spread
premiums are paid.64 Furthermore, the study argues that "yield spread
premiums are not simply another form of mortgage broker compensation,
but rather ... constitute a deceptive device that the mortgage broker in-
dustry employs to extract unnecessary and excessive payments from un-
suspecting borrowers." 65 Yield spread premiums are often paid to bro-
kers using only a rate sheet 66 provided by the lender and as a result, ser-
vices are not likely to be provided in exchange for that premium.67 These
payments represent a particularly egregious form of predatory lending
when they are used as a payment from the lender to the broker in ex-
change for convincing the borrower to agree to a higher interest rate and
are not disclosed or explained to the borrower.
C. Predatory Loan Example
To understand these predatory practices in context of a mortgage
transaction, an analysis of Sabrina Harris's experience obtaining a loan
demonstrates a few of the subtle tactics employed by some individuals in
68the mortgage industry. Ms. Harris negotiated for the purchase of a
home through a real estate agent, placed a $10,000 deposit on the home,
and agreed to purchase within three months. Shortly after finding a resi-
dence, Ms. Harris contacted a mortgage broker to secure financing and
complete the purchase of the home. The broker obtained a copy of Ms.
Harris's credit report and began the application process. The broker then
provided Ms. Harris with a "good faith" estimate of fees and a truth-in-
lending disclosure statement, both of which quoted a 30-year fixed rate
69
with an interest rate of 7% for a $200,000 loan. These documents also
64. Howell E. Jackson & Jerome Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread
Premiums, 95 (January 8, 2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/pdfs/
januarydraft.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
65. Id. at 9.
66. Mortgage brokers obtain several rate sheets from the lenders with whom they work to fund
their loans. Rate sheets denote the prices at which lenders are willing to fund mortgages. When the
broker is ready to lock in the financing terms for a particular customer, the broker usually uses the
rate sheets to pick among the terms that corresponding lending institutions offer. Id. at 61-62.
67. Cantwell, supra note 58, at 372.
68. This character is fictional and her loan circumstances are based on a collaboration of nu-
merous accounts of predatory lending practices.
69. A fixed rate mortgage loan generally bears interest at a fixed percentage rate per year.
JASPER, supra note 10, at 17. This means that the loan amount does not change and there is a set
monthly payment over the entire term of the loan. Id. In the first few years of the loan, the interest is
usually the larger share of the payment; during the last few years of the loan, the principal payment
makes up the larger share of the payment. By the end of the loan period, the borrower will have
repaid the entire principal and interest debt. Id.
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listed a number of additional fees. Ms. Harris was satisfied with the rate
and fees disclosed on the good faith estimate.
Three months later at closing, however, Ms. Harris was presented
with the final preprinted closing documents. The escrow agent who pre-
sented her with the documents informed her that she could not make any
changes to these forms. In contrast to the previous good faith estimate
and the truth-in-lending disclosure statements, the closing documents
stated the loan type as a one-year adjustable rate mortgage ("ARM")
70
with an interest rate of nine percent. In addition to the rate change by two
percentage points, the nine-percent ARM actually represented a much
higher rate because the loan's rate is designed to fluctuate substantially
after the first year. Despite the fact that the broker initially disclosed a
lower rate, the federal lending statutes consider this merely an estimate
and provide little protection for a borrower who is promised one rate, but
receives a different rate.
In addition to the rate change, the closing documents also included
additional fees. For example, the loan included a two-percent origination
fee ($4000); however, there was an additional fee stated as a $4500
P.O.C. When Ms. Harris noticed the fee, the agent told her not to worry
because the fee would be paid by the lender. However, Ms. Harris was
not informed that this fee was a yield spread premium, the device
through which the broker collected the payment of $4500 from the lender
in exchange for Ms. Harris' agreeing to a higher interest rate. She was
also unaware that she would consequently be paying a higher interest
rate for the life of the loan in exchange for the lender's payment of the
yield spread premium to the broker. In total, the broker was collecting
more than four percent of the loan as commission.
Although Ms. Harris could have theoretically rejected this mort-
gage because of the change in terms and fees, she faced losing her oppor-
tunity to purchase the home and the $10,000 deposit she paid to secure it.
The broker capitalized on the time and financial pressures facing Ms.
Harris. Because she did not have the bargaining power to negotiate for
more favorable terms, Ms. Harris was left to accept the mortgage agree-
ment, despite the unnecessarily high interest rate and unfavorable terms.
By failing to disclose the yield spread premium and changing the loan
type and interest rate as closing approached, this broker engaged in an
unscrupulous and manipulative practice. Although Ms. Harris was not
70. An adjustable rate mortgage does not have a fixed payment. The interest rate is subject to
periodic adjustment up or down at various intervals during the loan term. "The interest rate is gauged
by the movement of a specific standard, such as the existing prime rate at the time of adjustment."
Id. at 18. The rate only fluctuates after the X-year ARM period, which is one year in this example.
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necessarily a victim of outright fraud, she was deceived and taken advan-
tage of during the closing process because she was not provided with
material information about her loan. These predatory tactics employed by
some brokers and lenders result in deception for the borrower and profit-
able business for the mortgage industry. 7' Although many actors in the
mortgage industry provide timely and truthful disclosures and educate
borrowers, the numerous actors who engage in predatory practices
strongly oppose regulation of the mortgage industry.
III. BACKGROUND OF MORTGAGE LENDING LEGISLATION:
FEDERAL STATUTES
A. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
In 1974, Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act ("RESPA") to protect consumers from unnecessarily high settlement
costs and certain abusive practices that were developing in the residential
real estate industry.7 2 The purpose of RESPA, as stated by Congress,
was, in part, (1) to result in more effective advance disclosure to home
buyers and sellers of settlement costs, and (2) to eliminate kickbacks or
referral fees that unnecessarily increased settlement costs. 73 By control-
ling the manner in which settlement services are provided and compen-
sated and requiring advanced disclosure of settlement costs, RESPA re-
quirements enable the borrower to make an informed determination of
whether the offered terms are reasonable and acceptable.74
RESPA and Regulation X 75 attempt to fulfill RESPA's first purpose
by requiring that certain disclosures be made during application and clos-
ing, including disclosure of charges the borrower will have to pay for
settlement services.76 At the time of application, the lender must provide
71. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (opening statement of Senator
Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000). RESPA was enacted to handle federally related mortgage
loans, defined as loans secured by a first or subordinate lien on residential property designed for
occupancy by one to four families and that are made in whole or in part by any lender whose depos-
its or accounts are federally insured or by a lender that is federally regulated. Id. § 2602.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000); Washington Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County,
75 Cal. App. 4th 773, 779, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
74. ELIZABETH RENUART, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 51
(National Consumer Law Center ed., 2002).
75. 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (2003). To regulate settlement procedures for federally regulated loans,
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to prom-
ulgate Regulation X pursuant to the RESPA. See 12 U.S.C. 2617 § (2000).
76. Washington Mut. Bank, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 776. Settlement services include credit reports,
appraisal fees, recording fees, wire transfer fees, and other loan related services. Id.
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the applicant with an information booklet explaining the settlement proc-
ess.77 The lender must also include a good faith estimate of the charges
for particular settlement services with the booklet. 78 RESPA and Regula-
tion X require the use of a uniform settlement statement form at closing,
known as the "HUD-1" form.79 The HUD-1 form must conspicuously
and clearly itemize all charges imposed upon the borrower in connection
with the settlement. 80 However, the itemization on the HUD- 1 form does
not require an explanation of the nature or purpose of any of the itemized
costs.
8'
RESPA aims to fulfill its second purpose by prohibiting kickbacks
and unearned fees. Specifically, RESPA prohibits a person from paying
or receiving "a thing of value" pursuant to any written or oral "agreement
or understanding" for business incidental to or a part of a real estate "set-
tlement service" involving a "federally related mortgage loan." 82 An un-
earned fee is any payment to a party for which no services were pro-
vided. In the mortgage lending context, a kickback occurs when the
lender pays the broker for referring the borrower to that lender.
Regulation X supplements RESPA by defining terms, explaining
the requirements for the good faith estimate,S3describing the prohibition
on kickbacks and referral fees, presenting specific instructions for com-
pleting the HUD-1 form, and providing for administrative require-
ments.8 4 Specifically, Regulation X provides the timing requirements of
disclosure, which is an important factor in determining whether there is a
violation of RESPA. 85 For a residential mortgage transaction, both Regu-
lation X and RESPA require that a creditor or broker provide a good
faith estimate of fees, costs, and other mortgage terms before: (1) the
extension of credit; or (2) three business days after the creditor receives
the consumer's written application, whichever is earlier.
86
Despite the disclosure requirements, the provisions in neither
RESPA nor Regulation X establish a private right of action by a bor-
77. 12 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2000).
78. Id. § 2604(c).
79. 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (2000); 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.8, 3500.9 (2003).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2000).
81. See id.
82. 12 U.S.C. § 260 1(b) (2000); Washington Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County,
75 Cal. App. 4th 773, 779, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
83. 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(c)(2) (2003) provides: As to each charge with respect to which the
lender requires a particular settlement service provider to be used, the lender shall make its estimate
based upon the lender's knowledge of the amounts charged by such provider.
84.24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.8, 3500.14 (2003).
85. 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c) (2000).
86. Id.
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rower for inaccurate disclosures on the HUD-l form relating to charges
for settlement services.8 7 Rather, administrative enforcement of the dis-
closure requirements of RESPA and Regulation X regarding settlement
costs is the responsibility of the Secretary of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development and other federal, state, and local agencies that
have supervisory powers over lenders and others covered by RESPA.88
RESPA and Regulation X include express provisions relating to the
preemption of state laws. 89 Both the statute and the regulation provisions
provide that nothing in RESPA annuls, alters, affects, or exempts any
persons subject to its provisions from complying with the laws of any
state with respect to the settlement process, except to the extent that
those laws are inconsistent with any provision of RESPA.90 The provi-
sions also authorize the Secretary to determine whether an inconsistency
exists. 91 However, this authorization directs that the Secretary may not
determine a state law to be inconsistent if the state law gives greater pro-
tection to the consumer.
92
Courts have interpreted these preemption provisions to mean that
Congress intended for consumers to receive maximum protection not
only in the form of federal legislation, but also in the form of state
laws.93 Additionally, Congress did not intend any preemption of state
laws to occur if those laws resulted in more protections for the consumer,
so long as the state law did not interfere with the operation of the federal
law, and it was possible to comply with both the state and federal regula-
tions relating to mortgage lending.94 States have the right and responsi-
bility to provide heightened levels of consumer protection, depending on
the local environments. The mortgage industry, however, maintains that
inconsistent and restrictive state laws render it impossible for the indus-
try to successfully comply with the disclosure requirements of both state
and federal anti-predatory lending statutes.95
87, RESPA does, however, provide for a private right of action for violation of its provisions
relating to kickbacks and referral fees. Id. § 2607(d). For more discussion about kickbacks and refer-
ral fees, see RESPA Statement ofPolicy, supra note 57.
88.24 C.F.R. § 3500.19(a) (2003).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.13(a) (2003).
90. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (2000).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Washington Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 75 Cal. App. 4th 773, 785, 89
Cal. Rptr. 2d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
94. Id.
95. See Lampe, supra note 5, at 84.
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B. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
"TILA is primarily a disclosure statute." 96 Congress enacted TILA
under Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act to promote informed
borrowing by requiring lenders to fully disclose to borrowers the terms
of credit being extended to them.97 Congress charged the Federal Reserve
Board with the responsibility of implementing TILA.98 In response, the
Federal Reserve Board implemented Regulation Z, which has the force
and effect of law. 99 In addition, in order to strengthen the disclosure
regulations, Congress also enacted an amendment to TILA in 1994 called
the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act.'00
TILA and Regulation Z require lenders to provide consumers with a
written statement containing information about the cost of extending
credit.' 01 In the TILA statement, creditors must disclose finance charges
to ensure that the costs being charged for credit are not obscured in the
price of goods sold.10 2 TILA defines the finance charge as "the sum of all
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit
is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an inci-
dent to the extension of credit."'' 0 3 Some primary examples include inter-
est, service charges, and points or origination fees.' °4 Some costs which
meet this definition are not considered finance charges simply because
the statute, regulation, or accompanying commentary says they are not.10 5
Regulation Z also requires lenders to express the finance charge as
an annual percentage rate ("APR") to allow the consumer to comprehend
the actual costs of the loan.'0 6 The APR is intended to reflect the cost of
credit expressed as an annual rate by showing the correlation between the
finance charge and the amount financed, given the prescribed repayment
terms. 10 7 However, the APR excludes certain costs and therefore does not
reflect the actual cost of credit. 0 8 For example, Congress excluded title
insurance, appraisal, and document preparation fees from the APR, and
96. RENUART, supra note 74, at 85.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
98. Id. § 1604.
99. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2003).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(2000).
101. Id. § 226.1.
102. Id. § 226.6.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2003).
104. RENUART, supra note 74, at 85.
105. Id.
106. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(2) (2003).
107. RENUART, supra note 74, at 86.
108. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12, at 66.
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the Federal Reserve Board excluded application fees.'0 9 Even if the APR
included all fees, it would have limitations because it is not designed to
assist consumers in determining whether they should pay points up front
or bear the costs of credit over the life of the loan." 0 Additionally, the
APR does not provide information on the financial impact of the amount
of the monthly payment or the down payment.'1
The TILA finance charge and annual percentage rate disclosure re-
quirements were designed to protect consumers in lending situations
from becoming unknowingly obligated to pay hidden and unreasonable
charges imposed by lenders. 1 2 These disclosure requirements were
meant to allow borrowers to compare the terms of credit extended by
different lenders in a meaningful fashion." 3 However, TILA and Regula-
tion Z provide exceptions to the broad definition of finance charges, sub-
stantially narrowing the charges required to be disclosed under TILA.
1 4
In addition to these exceptions, the one-year statute of limitations pro-
vided for violation of TILA's disclosure requirements undermines
TILA's effectiveness. Borrowers often do not realize that material terms
have not been disclosed until they consult an attorney, often after the ex-
piration of the statute of limitations. 1 15
To strengthen disclosure regulations, Congress enacted the Home
Ownership Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") to amend TILA."
16
HOEPA creates a special class of regulated closed-end loans 117 that are
made at higher rates or with excessive costs and fees. These loans are not
only subject to special disclosure requirements but, more critically, they




112. Nussbaum v. Mortgage Serv. Am. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing
Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, 527 F.2d 257, 262 (3rd Cir. 1975)).
113. Johnson, 527 F.2d at 262.
114. Examples of such exceptions include charges by third parties provided certain conditions
are met, closing agent fees in certain circumstances, application fees, late fees, certain real estate
fees, but only if bona fide and reasonable, certain life, accident, health, or loss-of-income insurance,
credit property insurance premiums, debt cancellation coverage if certain conditions are met, certain
security interest charges, overdraft charges in certain circumstances, annual fees or fees periodically
imposed for participation in a credit plan, seller's points, and interest reductions in time deposits. 15
U.S.C. § 1605(d)-(e) (2000); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4(c) (2003).
115. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1148
(W.D. Wash. 2003).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
117. A closed-end loan has a fixed term. RENUART, supra note 74, at 86. In contrast, an open-
end loan has no fixed term and allows the borrower to repay as much or as little as he or she decides.
Id. Examples of open-end loans include credit card transactions and lines of credit. Most mortgages
are closed-end loans. Id.
[Vol. 28:239
Predatory Mortgage Lending
lenders to manipulate the cost of these transactions." 18 Although HOEPA
provides significant protections for high-risk borrowers who obtain high-
cost loans, HOEPA'S built-in system of triggers undermines its effec-
tiveness." 9 Specifically, the HOEPA protective provisions apply to a
loan only where the APR exceeds comparable treasury securities by ten
percentage points. 12 Because predatory lenders often ensure that the
HOEPA provisions do not apply to their loans, only a very small per-
centage of mortgages exceed the HOEPA threshold. 121 For example, a
$200,000 loan can have fees of $14,000 and an interest rate of 12% and
still not violate HOEPA. Because most predatory mortgages fall just be-
low this minimum threshold and are not subject to HOEPA regulations,
HOEPA protections are in effect illusory in addressing the problem of
predatory lending.
IV. BACKGROUND OF MORTGAGE LENDING LEGISLATION:
STATE STATUTES
The weak enforcement provisions of federal lending statutes un-
dermine these statutes' effectiveness. The absence of a private right of
action under RESPA, exceptions to disclosure requirements for certain
finance charges, and the limited one-year statute of limitations under
TILA all contribute to this ineffectiveness. The recent increase in state
legislation aimed at eradicating predatory lending illustrates the increas-
ing awareness of the inadequacies of federal regulation of the home
mortgage industry. 122 As of January 2004, twenty-five states had passed
laws restricting predatory lending. 23 State anti-predatory lending statutes
generally have the following characteristics: limiting the interest rates
and fees that a lender may charge; precluding lending to borrowers with-
out regard to their ability to repay; requiring refinance loans to provide a
net tangible financial benefit to the borrower; prohibiting excessive pre-
payment penalties; requiring disclosure to the borrower of various loan
118. Id.
119. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12, at 85.
120. Id. at 87.
121. Id. at 85.
122. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Motto, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders are
Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 890-895 (2002).
123. Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Preda-
tory Lending, GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Special Comm. on
Aging, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-280 at 5 (2004) [hereinafter GAO Consumer Protection Report).
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provisions; and requiring counseling for borrowers who are planning to
take out certain loans that are governed by these laws.
124
In 1999, North Carolina became the first state to enact such preda-
tory lending legislation.'2 5 This legislation included the aforementioned
elements of typical anti-predatory lending statutes and provided specific
requirements for high-cost loans. 126 Although the mortgage industry has
argued that state intervention would result in higher costs and reduced
access to credit for borrowers,' 27 two recent studies on the effectiveness
of North Carolina's predatory lending reform have demonstrated the op-
posite.128 The studies indicate that while subprime lending continued to
thrive in North Carolina, the statute prevented predatory terms on 31,500
subprime loans that were made in 2000 and saved borrowers at least
$100 million. 129 The studies conclude that because subprime lenders in
North Carolina continue to offer a wide range of loan options that pro-
vide borrowers with access to credit on fair terms, the reform legislation
is beginning to have its intended effect of reducing predatory lending
while increasing access to fair credit.130 Following North Carolina's lead,
a number of states and localities have enacted legislation aimed at curb-
ing predatory lending.'
3'
Despite the demonstrated success of anti-predatory lending legisla-
tion in North Carolina, the federal government is increasingly preempt-
ing the states' power to regulate lending, which has reduced the impact
124. Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit
Abusive Mortgage Lending andAccess to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Capital Mkt., Ins.
and Gov't Sponsored Enters., House Fin. Servs. Comm., 108th Cong. 228-229 (2003) (prepared
statement of Frank Raiter, Managing Dir. of Standard & Poor's Credit Market Services).
125. Keith Ernst, John Farris & Eric Stein, North Carolina's Subprime Home Loan Market
after Predatory Lending Reform, A Report From the Center for Responsible Lending iii (August 13,
2002) [hereinafter North Carolina Study], available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/
pdfs/HMDAStudyon NC Market.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24.1 -1.1 .A (2003).
127. See, e.g., Dona DeZure, Predatory Pandemonium, MORTGAGE BANKING, Apr. 2003, at
26-33; Neil J. Morse, The Predatory Lending Obstacle Course, MORTGAGE BANKING, Apr. 2002, at
53-59; Marion Lee, A Due Diligence Nightmare, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 2001, at 28-36.
128. North Carolina Study, supra note 125; Roberto Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R.
Davis, The Impact of North Carolina's Anti-Predatory Lending Lav: A Descriptive Assessment,
Center for Community Capitalism, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (June 25, 2003),
available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/PredLendingStudy.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2004).
129. North Carolina Study, supra note 125, at iii.
130. Id. at 12.
131. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB (West 2004);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 494.0078 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25 (West 2003); 63 PA.
CONS. STAT. & 456.503 (2003).
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of state legislation on predatory lending practices.132 The Office of
Comptroller of Currency ("OCC"), which charters, regulates, and super-
vises national banks, recently finalized rules designed to clarify its exclu-
sive authority over national banks. 133 The preemption rule declares that
state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to
exercise the power granted to it under federal law are preempted. 34 The
preemption rule does not, however, immunize national banks from com-
plying with state laws that affect the business of banking, such as con-
tract law, tort law, public safety law and general criminal law. 135 Al-
though the OCC preemption rule applies to exempt national banks, even
non-exempt national banks are often able to obtain protection from liabil-
ity. Non-bank lenders have the ability to become subsidiaries of national
banks, and consequently, the significant preemption of state anti-
predatory lending laws often undermines the effectiveness of the state
statutes. 1
36
States worry that, given the sweeping exemptions of the OCC's re-
cent regulations, new consumer protection laws explicitly governing
mortgage lending will have to originate at the federal level, without the
benefit of continued experimentation at the state level. 137 This is because
federal exemptions hinder state enforcement efforts and create incentives
for businesses to seek the regulatory structure with the fewest consumer
protections. 38 Nevertheless, states argue that their systems are better
equipped to respond quickly and to tailor solutions to the specific needs
of various communities and industry sectors. Although state anti-
predatory legislation is often exempted by federal law, states are still bet-
ter able to respond to state-specific predatory lending challenges.139 Bor-
rowers should consider using their state consumer protection statutes in
cases of predatory lending.
132. See Office of the Comptroller of Currency Preemption: Hearing Before the Oversight and
Operations Subcomm. House Fin. Serv. Comm., 108th Cong. 59-60 (2004) [hereinafter OCC Hear-
ing] (statement of Karen Thomas, Independent Community Bankers of America).
133.69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (January 13, 2004).
134. OCC Hearing, supra note 132, at 19 (statement of Julie Williams, First Senior Deputy
Comptroller and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of Currency).
135. Id.
136. Committee on Aging Hearing, supra note 6, at 60 (statement of Gavin Gee, Director of
Idaho Department of Finance).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., GAO Consumer Protection Report, supra note 123, at 6.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LEGISLATION:
"UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES" STATUTES
As indicated above, federal statutes do not adequately protect bor-
rowers from predatory lending because of the weakness of the statutes'
enforcement provisions. 140 Additionally, state anti-predatory legislation
is inconsistent and burdensome, and is undermined by the OCC's sweep-
ing exemptions for federal banks. 141 Unfair or deceptive acts or practices
("UDAP") statutes, however, prohibit conduct that is unfair, unconscion-
able, or deceptive in more general terms, but do not require proof of a
seller's fraudulent intent or knowledge. 142 As a result, claims under these
statutes are easier to prove than common law fraud or misrepresenta-
tion. 143 Additionally, UDAP statutes authorize private rights of action in
nearly every state and provide for such special private remedies as attor-
ney's fees for prevailing consumers in addition to punitive, treble, or
minimum damage awards. 144 These provisions encourage private litiga-
tion and deter merchant misconduct.
145
Every state has at least one UDAP statute that is construed with
broad applicability to consumer transactions and aimed at preventing
consumer deception and abuse in the marketplace. 146 These statutes have
generally incorporated the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), 147
which prohibits unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
Although the application of the terms "unfair and deceptive" may
produce confusion about which acts or practices are covered, state legis-
latures and federal agencies already utilize similar standards to ensure
uniformity in the determination of which practices are covered. 48 The
terms "unfair" and "deceptive" are each defined separately. With respect
to deceptive acts, the OCC stated in an advisory letter to the mortgage
industry that a practice may be considered deceptive where there is a rep-
resentation, omission, act, or practice that is likely to mislead a reason-
able consumer in the targeted audience in a material way. 149 In clarifying
140. See id. at 54.
141. Lampe, supra note 5, at 78, 82.
142. JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRAC-





147. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
148. See SHELDON, supra note 142, at 31.
149. Office of Comptroller of Currency, Administrator of National Banks, Guidance on Unfair
or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Advisory Letter, 1 (March 22, 2002) available at:
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
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the role of the term "deceptive" in the context of predatory lending, the
OCC referred to the FTCA.1 50 With respect to the first prong of the "de-
ceptive" test, practices that can be misleading or deceptive include false
oral or written representations, misleading claims about costs of services
or products, use of bait and switch techniques, or failure to provide
promised services or products.15 1 Determining the reasonable consumer
in the second prong requires an analysis of the totality of the circum-
stances and the net impression that is made on the consumer.152 A mate-
rial misrepresentation under the third prong is one that would have a sub-
stantial effect on the consumer's choice or conduct concerning a particu-
lar product or service.1 53 On the other hand, with respect to unfair acts,
"[a] practice may be found to be unfair if the following occur: (1) The
practice causes substantial consumer injury such as monetary harm; (2)
the injury is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer or to competi-
tion; and (3) the injury caused by the practice is one that consumers
could not reasonably have avoided."
1 54
Application of UDAP statutes provides significant protection for
both state and private claimants.1 55 Such remedies allow for widespread
redress of marketplace misconduct and consumer abuse.1 56 Because the
state consumer protection and UDAP statutes prohibit similar conduct in
each state and provide private rights of action, longer statutes of limita-
tions, and attorney's fees, they are an effective alternative to combat
predatory lending.
A. Benefits of UDAP Statutes
Unfair and deceptive practices statutes provide an important alter-
native to federal and state anti-predatory lending legislation because they
usually provide individuals with private rights of action and attorney's
fees. 157
Every state, except Iowa and North Dakota, provides a private right
of action for alleged violations of state consumer protection statutes.1 58
This private right of action emerged after states realized that the state
attorneys general and other administrative agencies were unable to han-
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 3-4.
154. Id. at 4-5.
155. SHELDON, supra note 142, at 31.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW, § 6.2 (2003).
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die the quantity of complaints. 159 States also realized that private actions
represent a random selection, are less subject to politicization than gov-
ernment enforcement, and are viewed as a marketplace solution to a
marketplace problem. 160 Although the application of the private right of
action differs among states, the ability to bring a timely private action
without relying on overburdened administrative agencies is important
because victims of predatory lending are likely to face foreclosure pro-
ceedings, 161 or lose their affirmative claim because of the statutes of limi-
tations. 162
UDAP statutes also often provide provisions for attorney's fees.
Many plaintiffs seek non-monetary damages such as injunctions against
foreclosure, rescission of the loans, or changes in the loan terms. Al-
though damages in some cases of predatory lending may be severe be-
cause individuals lose substantial equity in their homes or lose their
homes due to foreclosure, many potential cases of predatory lending
practices will not provide significant damages from which a plaintiff will
be able pay an attorney. Consequently, the UDAP statutes' provisions for
attorney's fees typically provides a means through which plaintiffs can
obtain representation in cases where monetary damages are marginal.
B. Application of Washington Consumer Protection Statutes
to Violations of Federal Statutes (RESPA & TILA)
The following examination of cases alleging violations of the
Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") demonstrates how con-
sumers can effectively use consumer protection statutes to enforce the
policies and requirements of federal lending statutes. The Washington
CPA is intended to prohibit individuals in trade or commerce from en-
gaging in unfair or deceptive practices in the course of business with
consumers. 63 Because the Washington Legislature passed the act to pro-
tect citizens from unfair and deceptive trade and commercial practices,
persons injured in their business or property in violation of the CPA may
bring a civil action to recover their actual damages sustained. 164 To pre-
vail on a CPA claim, a plaintiff must prove each of the following five
elements: (1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or
practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) that affects the public
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., RENUART, supra note 74, at 26.
162. Id. at 53, 77.




interest; and (4) caused injury (5) to plaintiff and his or her business or
property.
165
In applying the CPA to mortgage practices, courts have held that
violations of the provisions of the federal lending statutes constitute un-
fair and deceptive practices in violation of consumer protection stat-
utes. 166 Specifically, the failure to make accurate and timely disclosures
under federal statutes such as TILA and RESPA constitutes an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in violation of the CPA. 
167
In Brazier v. Security Pacific Mortgage, the plaintiff alleged that
the mortgage broker failed to disclose in the signed good faith estimate
that the broker would receive, among other payments, a 1.5% yield
spread premium from the lender.' 68 The plaintiff claimed that he had no
knowledge that the broker would receive such a payment if the plaintiff
did not pay origination fees. 16 9 On a summary judgment motion, the
court found that inadequate disclosure of a mortgage broker fee in a
signed good faith estimate violated the CPA and the Mortgage Broker
Practices Act ("MBPA"). 70 While a question of fact remained with re-
gard to the timeliness of such disclosures, the court determined that as a
matter of law, the failure to disclose the mortgage broker fee was a viola-
tion of RESPA and TILA.
171
After finding that the failure to disclose a mortgage broker fee was
a violation of these federal statutes, the court recognized that Washington
law specifically incorporated RESPA's and TILA's disclosure require-
ments. 172 Because RESPA, TILA, and the MBPA each require that a
mortgage broker provide the borrower with an itemization or good faith
estimate of all fees and costs in connection with a residential mortgage
loan, 173 and failure to make such disclosures constitutes an unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice, the court held that the inadequate disclosures in
the signed good faith estimate also violated the CPA.
174
165. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 780,
719 P.2d 531, 533 (1986).
166. Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003); Anderson
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
167. Brazier, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (discussing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86, 19.146.100
(1999)).
168. Id. at 1139.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1141.
171. Id.
172. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.030(2) (1999).
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.030 (1999).
174. Brazier, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
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In a similar case, Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, the
court held that Wells Fargo's failure to provide the RESPA-required dis-
closure of the payment of a yield spread premium within three days of a
borrower's loan application was a deceptive act for purposes of a CPA
claim. 175 Anderson alleged that her mortgage broker engaged in an unfair
and deceptive act or practice when it did not properly disclose to her that
the yield spread premium paid by her lender was for brokering a loan at a
higher interest rate than was otherwise available to her. 7 6 The court de-
termined that both RESPA and TILA unambiguously require lenders
(and to the extent that they are not the lender's exclusive agent, mortgage
brokers) to disclose to a loan applicant information about the proposed
loan, including the fact that any yield spread premium will be paid out-
side closing by the lender to the broker, and the amount of such a pay-
ment. 177 RESPA requires this information to be disclosed on the good
faith estimate no later than three days after the loan application is submit-
ted, and not at closing when it may be too late for the borrower to use the
information. 178
The court specifically rejected the notion that the borrower should
have detected the payment of a yield spread premium from either the
disclosed interest rate, the interest rate and the disclosed finance charges,
or the origination fee. 179 Because RESPA and TILA require an "up front"
disclosure at the application stage-not the closing stage-of the loan
process, and Wells Fargo failed to provide information required under
these statutes, they engaged in a deceptive act.' 80 The court deemed that
the TILA claim was barred because of its one-year statute of limita-
tions."' However, the court did recognize that even though the TILA
claim was time-barred, the borrower was still able to assert the violation
as a basis for her timely CPA claim. 182 The defendant's successful asser-
tion of a statute of limitations does not mean that the violation did not
occur; rather, it means that the claim based on it is stale.183 Consequently,
175. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1147-1148 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1146 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c) (2000)); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(b), (c) (2003); 12
C.F.R. § 226.18 (2003)).
178. Anderson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1147-48.
181. Id. at 1148-49.




where the actual claim asserted-the CPA-has a longer limitations pe-
riod, the violation may still be used to support the timely claim. 
84
Although plaintiffs may allege violations of RESPA, TILA, and un-
fair and deceptive acts or practices statutes as distinct causes of action in
the same complaint, the precedent established in Brazier and Anderson
presents another framework for courts to recognize that the actual viola-
tion of the federal statute is sufficient to meet the unfair and deceptive
act element of state consumer protection statutes. 185 The ability for bor-
rowers to utilize the state's consumer protection act where their broker or
lender has violated federal statutes is significant because borrowers ac-
quire a private right of action and special remedies such as attorney's
fees and punitive, treble, or minimum damages. 86 Additionally, because
consumer protection statutes are more uniform than state anti-predatory
legislation, compliance is less burdensome for the mortgage industry.
VI. How UDAP STATUTES ALLEVIATE PROBLEMS WITH
FEDERAL & STATE LEGISLATION
A. Federal legislation does not adequately protect borrowers
against predatory lending.
Despite the protective purpose of RESPA and TILA to ensure that
borrowers receive accurate and timely disclosures of the material terms
of their loans, RESPA and TILA do not adequately protect borrowers
against predatory lending because (1) RESPA does not allow for a pri-
vate right of action and (2) TILA has only a one-year statute of limita-
tions.
The right to initiate a private action against a mortgage broker or
lender under RESPA for inadequate disclosures is important for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) The failure to disclose the yield spread premium in-
creases the interest rate by circumventing the intended use of the yield
spread premium-giving the borrower the option of deferring closing
costs; 187 (2) the resulting higher interest rates often force borrowers into
foreclosure;' 88 and (3) the administrative agencies charged with the en-
forcement of RESPA provisions do not have the resources or the time to
prosecute each alleged violation or to provide immediate relief for bor-
184. Id.
185. Id.; Brazier, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
186. SHELDON, supra note 142, at 31.
187. See, e.g., Yield Spread Premiums Hearing, supra note 60, at 2.
188. See, e.g., RENUART, supra note 74, at 26.
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rowers faced with imminent foreclosure. 89 Although the inclusion of a
private right of action under RESPA may help alleviate these problems,
consumers have been unsuccessful in their efforts to convince Congress
to provide a private right of action under RESPA.' 90 Utilizing the private
right of action afforded under the state UDAP statutes represents a prac-
tical, available alternative for plaintiffs seeking redress for violations of
RESPA.
Unlike RESPA, TILA does provide for a private right of action;
however, TILA similarly fails to provide adequate relief for borrowers
because of its one-year statute of limitations.19I In many situations, such
as in Anderson' 92 and in the Sabrina Harris example discussed above, the
borrower thought that she was deceived in her mortgage transaction.
However, in these situations, many borrowers do not immediately realize
that this conduct violates the disclosure requirements of TILA. It is often
not until the borrower seeks legal advice that she makes this realization,
and by this point, her TILA claim is likely barred by the one-year statute
of limitations. The limited statute of limitations does not place account-
ability on the mortgage industry because it provides them with nearly
immediate legal protection from liability for nondisclosure after the stat-
ute of limitations has run.193 The mortgage industry's ability to escape
from liability under RESPA and TILA frustrates the Congressional intent
of the disclosure requirements to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to easily compare the various
credit terms available.1
94
B. Consumer protection statutes provide a uniform and
efficient standard for compliance.
Although RESPA and TILA are based on strong public policy con-
siderations, they lack the necessary enforcement mechanisms that state
consumer protection statutes provide. Consumer protection statutes sim-
ply require that mortgage brokers and lenders refrain from engaging in
unfair and deceptive acts or practices. 195 Such practices include false oral
or written misrepresentations, misleading claims, and the failure to pro-
189. See Committee on Aging Hearing, supra note 6, at 61 (statement of Gavin Gee, Director
of Idaho Department of Finance).
190. See generally Sanders, supra note 28.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2000).
192. Anderson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1143, (W.D. Wash.
2003).
193. See id. at 1148.
194. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
195. See SHELDON, supra note 142, at 183-86.
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vide promised services or products discussed in the FTCA-all prime
examples of predatory lending. Similarly, mortgage practices are unfair
when they are coercive or cause injury that could reasonably have been
avoided if the consumer had sufficient information to make the choice.
196
Therefore, when a mortgage broker or lender fails to disclose the yield
spread premium before closing or changes the type or interest rate of the
loan at closing when it is too late for the borrower to seek another loan,
the mortgage broker or lender has engaged in a deceptive practice. Al-
though the broad applicability of an unfair or deceptive act may initially
appear too overreaching for the mortgage industry, it provides a more
uniform requirement than the alleged "patchwork" of state regulation. If
borrowers use their private rights of action to hold the parties engaging in
predatory lending practices responsible for such deceptive practices un-
der the state consumer protection statutes, the mortgage industry would
refrain from predatory tactics that would render them liable.
C. UDAP statutes are favorable because they punish predatory actors
while protecting legitimate brokers and lenders.
The mortgage industry claims that the "patchwork" of regulations
resulting from the numerous state and local anti-predatory lending stat-
utes and ordinances will dramatically increase the cost of compliance for
the industry. 197 Though studies examining the impact of the North Caro-
lina predatory lending reform indicate that the costs of obtaining a mort-
gage in that state remained unchanged and the incidents of predatory
loans decreased,' 98 the industry persistently warned that the increased
costs of compliance will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
mortgage rates.199 The mortgage industry's argument that it bears an in-
creased cost in complying with many state and local anti-predatory lend-
ing laws that are vague, ambiguous, and have substantially different
terms has some merit.20° However, when consumers utilize consumer
protection statutes to remedy predatory loans and deter predatory lending
practices, the unscrupulous actors will be the ones in the mortgage indus-
try that bear the increased costs. This alternative approach negatively
affects only those brokers and lenders who engage in unfair and decep-
196. See Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 12, at 79-81.
197. See Lampe, supra note 5 at 78 and 82.
198. See North Carolina Study, supra note 125, at 12.
199. See id. at 82.
200. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 127, at 57 (discussing a county ordinance in Georgia that was
struck down by a Superior Court judge on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and void because
it attempted to regulate an area of law over which the state had sole jurisdiction).
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tive practices. Without an effective federal statutory or state common law
alternative to the increased protection afforded to borrowers by state leg-
islation, some unscrupulous mortgage brokers and lenders will likely
continue to engage in predatory lending practices.2 °'
In addition to its claims about increased consumer costs, individuals
in the mortgage industry warn that state government intervention "raises
the cost of lending to the point that lenders will leave the market rather
than make loans to people that might be marginal risks., 20 2 The argument
that state legislation will reduce the availability of funding for mortgages
addresses the important point that a borrower does not benefit from ex-
panded credit if the credit is offered on unfair terms or involves preda-
203tory practices °. Because access to a predatory loan is not a benefit to a
homeowner since access to destructive credit is worse than no credit,
20 4
regulations that prevent access to predatory loans do not prevent borrow-
ers from accessing beneficial credit. Thus, eliminating and pushing these
lenders out of the market makes the industry profitable for those lenders
or brokers who do comply with federal and state laws that protect con-
sumers. The notion that the industry should face less regulation in order
to provide access to additional predatory loans is a self-serving proposi-
tion for the mortgage industry.
Additionally, the argument that predatory lending legislation will
harm the people it was intended to protect is tenuous and is contradicted
by the evidence of the North Carolina study on the impact of that state's
legislation.20 5 The North Carolina study of 3.3 million loans made in the
state between 1998 and 2000 found that after the legislation there was a
reduction in predatory loans, but no change in the cost of subprime credit
or reduction in access to credit for high risk borrowers. 0 6 The study re-
ports that borrowers in North Carolina with an annual income of less
than $25,000 received a higher ratio of subprime to prime loans than
similarly situated borrowers in other states.20 7 This suggests that the
changes in the regulatory environment, like those implemented in North
Carolina, would have no significant detrimental impact on the supply of
subprime credit to these high-risk borrowers. 20 8 Despite the fact that the
North Carolina Study indicates that legislation can reduce predatory
201. See Sanders, supra note 28, at 146.
202. Morse, supra note 127, at 55.
203. See Sanders, supra note 28, at 141.
204. See id. at 141.
205. North Carolina Study, supra note 125.
206. Id. at 12.




terms without necessarily reducing access to credit, the mortgage indus-
try maintains its position that such legislation would have a considerable
negative impact on the survival of their industry.2 °9
However, the industry's argument that the complex patchwork of
state and local regulations increases costs for consumers should not be
sufficient to shield the mortgage industry from liability for predatory
practices. When there are problems with compliance and enforcement
under the federal statutes, and the state statutes place the burden on bro-
kers and lenders working in numerous jurisdictions, consumers and
courts should rely on the alternative protections of state consumer protec-
tion statutes. Although additional legislation at the federal or state level
may reduce predatory lending practices, UDAP statutes give consumers
an existing, practical means of redress against predatory lenders. Also,
the employment of state UDAP statutes to eliminate predatory lending
practices will likely alleviate industry concerns because the UDAP stat-
utes' prohibitions are uniform and efficient. The uniformity of these stat-
utes is evidenced by their requirements that brokers and lenders refrain
from making material representations that are likely to deceive consum-
ers. Additionally, state consumer protection statutes prevent the industry
from engaging in unfair and deceptive practices. When the industry
complies with these statutes by disclosing material terms and sufficiently
educating borrowers about changes in loan terms and interest rates, the
mortgage process is likely to become more efficient for both the industry
and the borrower.
UDAP statutes that reduce the prevalence of predatory lending pro-
vide a net benefit to society because the costs saved by the consumers
outweigh any increased costs to those engaging in unfair and deceptive
practices in the mortgage industry. They do not impose additional com-
pliance requirements; rather, they require that the individuals in the
mortgage industry simply refrain from engaging in unfair and deceptive
practices. In doing so, these statutes reduce the burden on the industry by
protecting brokers and lenders who refrain from unfair or deceptive acts
or practices and punishing only the predatory actors.
D. Where national banks are exempted from state anti-predatory lending
legislation, UDAP statutes represent a viable alternative.
Despite the potential effectiveness of state and local regulation of
predatory mortgage practices, many of these statutes and ordinances may
209. See Lampe, supra note 5, at 81-82.
2005] 463
Seattle University Law Review
become preempted by new federal legislation. 2 '0 This potential preemp-
tion is evidenced by the recent exemptions for federal banks. With re-
spect to preemption, the present versions of RESPA and TILA empha-
size the importance of the continued enactment of state law, except to the
extent that state law is inconsistent with federal statutes.2 ' Congress in-
tended that the states remain free to impose greater protection for bor-
rowers and did not intend for the federal statutes' disclosure regime to
provide the maximum protection to which borrowers are entitled nation-
wide.21 2 However, even without explicit federal preemption, the exemp-
tions for national banks demonstrate the trend toward the weakening of
state anti-predatory lending statutes.
Moreover, as federal agencies seek expansion of their regulatory ju-
risdiction, consumer advocates favor an expanding federal administrative
system, and national creditors lobby for federal preemption of more
stringent state laws, federal preemption is likely to be the next step in
predatory lending legislation. t 3 Although consumer advocates encourage
Congress to enact more protective and enforceable federal legislation,
consumers do not favor preemption of more protective state laws. 214 Pre-
emption of protective state legislation without an adequate federal re-
placement rewards the mortgage industry for its successful lobbying, but
does not address the problem of predatory lending. 1 5 The deleterious
effects of potential federal preemption are evidenced by the OCC's re-
cent exemption for national banks from state anti-predatory lending
laws.216 The effect of this decision is the preemption of state reform laws
in 23 states. 217 Because of this possible federal preemption of state laws,
it is important for consumers to have an alternative means through which
to hold mortgage brokers and lenders liable for unfair and deceptive con-
duct when brokering or funding a mortgage.
While federal regulation may be successful in preempting specific
state anti-predatory lending statutes, the existence of parallel federal
regulation in the field of consumer protection is usually no bar to state
210. See, e.g., Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 833, 108th Cong. (2003).
211. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.13(a) (2003); 15 U.S.C. § 1610 (2003).
212. Black v. Financial Freedom, 92 Cal. App. 4th 917, 936, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (2001).
213. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note I, at 54 (prepared statement of the
Honorable Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of the State of Iowa).
214. See id. at 55.
215. See id.
216. OCC Hearing, supra note 132, at 58-59 (statement of Rep. Peter King, N.Y.).
217. Press Release, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, NCRC Testifies in Con-
gress: Asserts OCC Preemption Will Hurt Housing and Community Development 1 (January 28,
2004) available at http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press-releaseslPressRelonOCCCtest.pdf (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004).
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efforts.21 8 In fact, the Federal Trade Commission encouraged the states to
adopt "little FTC acts" during the 1960s as an attempt to broaden the
reach of consumer protection regulation.21 9 In analyzing the relationship
between specific federal and state general consumer protection acts,
courts have held that where the federal regulation encouraged concurrent
state legislation and sellers could easily comply with both the federal and
state consumer protection regulations simultaneously, the state consumer
protection laws should not be preempted.220 The mortgage industry,
however, maintains that state anti-predatory lending specific laws should
be preempted because they impose a burden so substantial that they ren-
der compliance with federal and state requirements impossible. 221 Be-
cause the industry may successfully convince Congress that these state
laws should be preempted by existing or additional federal lending legis-
lation, and state UDAP statutes are rarely preempted by federal law,
UDAP statutes represent a viable, concrete, and powerful alternative to
state and federal lending-specific legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The mortgage industry plays a critical role in allowing individuals
to obtain financing to pursue the American dream of homeownership.
However, predatory brokers and lenders engage in unfair and deceptive
practices that are prohibited by consumer protection statutes in every
state. Predatory practices harm both the borrowers and certain lenders in
the mortgage industry who do follow state and federal regulations by
keeping the borrower informed and properly and timely disclosing fees.
The industry and consumers should work to eradicate the presence of
predatory mortgage practices. Where consumers and courts hold ac-
countable only those lenders and brokers who engage in unfair and de-
ceptive acts, the victims of predatory loans and the honest sector of the
industry will be protected. When consumers are provided with the dis-
closures that enable them to make educated and informed decisions about
their mortgage terms, the marketplace will function fairly and properly.
The current federal regulatory structure under RESPA and TILA is
undermined by ambiguous terms, numerous exemptions, and weak en-
forcement provisions; state legislation is complex, inconsistent, and faces
218. PRIDGIN, supra note 158, at 524.
219. Id.
220. Id. (discussing Nat'l Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136, 138-140 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that West Virginia's extensive regulation of the pre-need funeral contract industry
was not preempted by the FTC's Funeral Rule)).
221. See generally, DeZure, supra note 127; Morse, supra note 127.
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likely federal preemption. Accordingly, consumers should allege viola-
tions of the federal statutes as a way of meeting the unfair and deceptive
practices element under state consumer protection statutes. The private
right of action, the longer statutes of limitations, and the provision of
attorney's fees provided for in state consumer protection statutes enable
consumers to more effectively litigate claims against brokers and lenders
for damages resulting from manipulation and deception in the mortgage
process. Additionally, state consumer protection statutes will likely with-
stand the challenges of federal preemption that are lodged against state
anti-predatory lending statutes. When consumers become victims of
predatory lending practices, they should utilize provisions set forth in
state consumer protection statutes that provide for private rights of ac-
tion, longer statutes of limitations, and attorney's fees. The remedial and
preventative nature of consumer protection statutes makes them an effec-
tive alternative to federal and state anti-predatory lending regulations
when brokers and lenders engage in unfair and deceptive practices.
